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Military leaders, policymakers, and academics have long debated the rela-
tive merits of volunteer versus conscript armies. They also have studied
the possible effects of eroding resolve among mass publics in democratic
states during wartime. In this paper, we use battleﬁeld casualty data from
the population of interstate wars to compare theories of property takings
and domestic institutions. We ﬁnd conscription, like other non-market-
based property takings, to be a wasteful means of mobilizing military
manpower. Volunteer armies suffer far fewer casualties than their con-
scripted counterparts. We also ﬁnd that this effect compounds when
interacted with regime type. Volunteer democratic armies suffer especially
few casualties. Finally, we ﬁnd that democratic societies are willing to
bear the costs of large-scale commitments to maintaining state sover-
eignty and survival when targeted by authoritarian states, at times in the
face of certain defeat.
Since the age of Napoleon, military strategists and planners have marveled at the
latent power of national conscript armies. Conscription makes possible the mass
mobilization of a state’s population for military purposes, an alluring prospect for
many political leaders. At the same time, however, conscript armies also have
more than their share of detractors. Potentially unwieldy due to their typical size
and poor training, conscript armies may lack the war-ﬁghting capacity of their
professional volunteer counterparts.2 Disagreement over the political and wartime
costs associated with the two mobilization strategies has become increasingly rele-
vant due to questions about whether the US military has stretched itself too thin
in Afghanistan and Iraq (Crabtree 2009).
1 The authors thank the participants in Government 3005b at Harvard University and the anonymous referees
for their advice and suggestions. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2006 International Studies
Association Annual Meeting. All errors are the authors alone. Replication data are available at http://www.
michaelchorowitz.com/data/.
2 This could also theoretically be true of mercenaries.
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In this paper, we investigate the links between mobilization schemes, domestic
political institutions, and casualty rates with tests ranging from simple correla-
tions to more complicated regression models. We derive hypotheses from prop-
erty takings theories and theories of democratic institutional constraints. From
the takings perspective, the closer a state’s compensation for a taking is to the
free market value for property, the less likely the state is to wastefully use the
property. Applied to military forces, because conscription is a non-market
method of recruiting military forces, conscript forces will be used with less regard
for the lives of soldiers than volunteer armies, resulting in conscript armies
suffering greater casualties. Ceteris paribus, volunteer armies will take fewer
casualties.3
In contrast to the economic perspective, which focuses on a state’s willingness
to waste an uncompensated asset, a more explicitly political perspective looks at
the domestic political consequences of high casualties. Within the literature on
the impact of regime type on military performance, there is an ongoing debate
about democratic states’ ability to sustain high casualties (Bennett and Stam
1996, 1998; Gartner 1997; Berinsky 2004, 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). Siver-
son found that democracies appear to have lower casualty rates as well as suf-
fering lower aggregate casualties than their more authoritarian counterparts
(Siverson 1995). Others state that the importance of regime type is often over-
stated (Desch 2002). We engage both those who claim that regime type is irrel-
evant in determining outcomes in international relations and those who believe
that democracies make for inferior war ﬁghters, implying relatively higher casu-
alty rates (Brooks 2003).
To assess these claims about the effects of manpower policies and political
institutions, we evaluate the effects of military recruitment strategies and regime
type associated with battleﬁeld casualties among the population of interstate wars
from 1815 to 2001. In contrast to some prior literature on military labor policy
and casualties, we ﬁnd that volunteer armies, in general, sustain signiﬁcantly
fewer casualties than conscript armies. Moreover, the interaction between volun-
teer recruitment and democratic institutions is also associated with a decline in
casualty rates much larger than what we would expect given a simple additive
model. Finally, conﬁrming prior research on the importance of the stakes in
inﬂuencing the propensity of democracies to ﬁght, we ﬁnd that democracies are
able to sustain high levels of casualties when targeted in existential wars (Mueller
2005).
The Puzzle
The link between military labor policy and casualties, theoretically, should be easy
to discern. We know from Great Britain’s experience in World War I and the Uni-
ted States’ experience in World War I and World War II that ﬁghting in extremely
large wars can cause countries to shift from volunteer to conscription recruitment.
There is an endogeneity effect: the need for more soldiers due to the size of the
war drives a shift in military recruitment away from a volunteer military and
toward conscription. In smaller wars, states employ volunteer militaries because
there is a lower need for labor.
Focusing on a Correlates of War derived data set of wars from 1815 to 2001,
with one observation per country, per war, reveals a potentially different relation-
ship between military labor policy and casualties. While the recent American and
3 More broadly, debates about military effectiveness in the United States have often taken the form of evaluating
the capabilities of the all-volunteer force (Altman and Fechter 1967; Hansen and Weisbrod 1967; Miller and Johnson
1968; Cooper 1982; Binkin 1984; Lee and McKenzie 1992; Warner and Asch 1995; Bicksler, Gilroy, John, and Rums-
feld 2004).
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European experience has made volunteer armies appear to be the norm, the reality
is just the opposite. Whether wars are big or small, war-participants typically have
employed conscription armies. Of the 286 armies for which we have military
recruiting data, only 52 of them, or about 18%, utilize volunteer armies.4
The typical war is also short and of low intensity compared with oft-cited wars,
such as the World Wars or the Vietnam War. The median interstate war (see Table 1)
lasts about 4 months with about 1,800 casualties. This suggests that states select
conscription armies even when expectations of casualties are very low. Figure 1, a
histogram of casualties for conscript armies, shows that countries employ conscrip-
tion armies independent of expectations about casualties and war size.
What are the military consequences of the choice to use conscription militar-
ies more broadly? Moreover, how does it relate to a critical question in the
literature on international conﬂict—the role of domestic political regimes? In
what follows, we explore the relative efﬁciency of volunteer and conscription
militaries, along with the interaction between military labor policy and domestic
politics.
Literature Review
Existing Literature on Recruitment and Casualties
Early work on military recruitment strategies typically approached the issue from
a labor economics perspective (Altman and Fechter 1967; Hansen and Weisbrod
1967; Oi 1967; Miller and Johnson 1968; Fisher 1969), focusing on ‘‘efﬁciency’’ as
an economic measure, that is, whether a draft is the most economically efﬁcient
means of recruiting the appropriate numbers of military forces with the least eco-
nomic cost (Lee and McKenzie 1992; Warner and Asch 1995). Rotte and Schmidt
(2003) looked at battleﬁeld outcomes, but they did not evaluate conscription as a
potential factor inﬂuencing casualties. Rohlfs (2005) models the persistence of sol-
diers’ lives as a function of the utility they provide to the government. Using
World War II battle data, he ﬁnds that American relative investments in tanks
and troops in World War II were roughly ‘‘efﬁcient’’ in the context of the United
States’ relative capital and labor endowments.
Choi and James (2003:811) examine the relationship between conscription
forces and militarized disputes. They argue that the maintenance of large peace-
time conscript armies makes military aggression more likely by providing
national leaders with relatively easy means, in the form of readily deployable
military forces, to initiate militarized disputes. Choi and James (2003:802) con-
clude that the choice to adopt a volunteer recruiting strategy likely results from
political pressure rather than military need. As a result, volunteer armies risk
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics for Key Dependent and Independent Variables
Variables Observations Minimum Maximum Median Mean Standard deviation
Casualties 309 0 1.33E+07 1800 119,312.50 800,687.70
Conscription 286 0 1 1 0.82 0.39
Polity IV 279 0 20 6 8.87 7.41
Initiation 292 0 1 0 0.47 0.50
Terrain 297 0.30 1.05 0.60 0.70 0.21
Strategy 297 1 5 3 2.97 0.80
Prewar army size 300 1 5100 167 524.21 884.46
Military spending 268 103 3.22E+08 161,466 7,384,484 3.19e+07
Duration 302 5 3735 128 502.42 718.79
4 Coding is described below in the research design section.
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being poorly trained, inherently less capable, and hence more likely to sustain
high casualty rates.
In contrast to Choi and James’ results, Vasquez ﬁnds that democratic conscrip-
tion armies, in militarized disputes, suffer fewer casualties on average than demo-
cratic volunteer armies. He argues that conscript armies constrain democratic
institutions in two ways that make casualties less likely. First, conscription guaran-
tees that more soldiers from politically powerful sectors of American society will
join the military, increasing the lobbying power of groups seeking to constrain the
military by making sure more powerful actors take notice. Second, a broad distri-
bution of war costs in society causes politicians to fear a political backlash if high
casualties occur, meaning democratic leaders will avoid strategies that make casu-
alties more likely (Vasquez 2005:853). Vasquez makes an implicit ‘‘audience cost’’
argument, arguing that because democratic conscript armies tend to be both larger
and somewhat more representative than volunteer armies, governments relying on
conscription will face more pressure to minimize casualties than they would if vol-
unteers were involved. Vasquez’ argument also raises a question about selection
into wars. If it is harder to get consent for conscription militaries, they should only
be employed in wars where clear national interests are at stake and the nation
strongly supports military action.
Are the low casualty rates associated with the modern American volunteer
military anomalous? We present two theories below which shed light on the ques-
tion, one about regime type and one about recruitment systems, recognizing that
they may interact.
Property Rights Perspective
In a September 2003 speech on the all-volunteer force in America, Former Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explicitly linked compensation and incentives
in the all-volunteer force to its use:
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FIG 1. Distribution of Casualties Taken by Conscript Armies
(Notes. The scale is unevenly distributed to better demonstrate the range of casualties. Scale: 0–2,000
casualties in bins of 100; 2,000–20,000 casualties in bins of 1,000; 20,000–100,000 casualties in bins of
10,000; 100,000–1,000,000 casualties in bins of 100,000; 1,000,000–14,000,000 casualties in bins of
1,000,000.)
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Because admittedly, volunteers cost more than conscripts. And we had to change
the way we thought about how we procure and manage our people. Manpower
can no longer be regarded as abundant and cheap, but rather had to be treated as
it should be, as scarce and expensive. And we had to learn how to compete in the
civilian labor market for young people. That meant paying a lot of attention to
the compensation and quality of life package that we offer prospective recruits.
But a quality force is a productive force, and it has to be compensated accordingly.
It costs money to maintain standards. (Wolfowitz 2003)
Wolfowitz linked volunteer forces and market mechanisms that dictate compensa-
tion rates and result in scarcity. The converse is also true: competitive markets are
not needed for the recruitment of conscripts, nor are conscripts scarce. In particular,
Fischel argues that states are relatively less likely to waste a particular resource only
when the owner is not exploiting the property for maximal gain or when the efﬁ-
ciency gains made for compensating for the land overcome the costs of non-com-
pensation (Michelman 1967; Fischel 1995). Said differently, if the state does not pay
fair market value for the property, it is likely to waste the potential productive use
of that property. One source of this waste is in the ‘‘demoralization costs’’ of those
whose property is seized. After witnessing property seizures, individuals develop
shorter investment time horizons, meaning they do not devote signiﬁcant resources
to developing the full productive capacity of their property (Fischel 1995).
This labor market view of conscription points to North’s (1981) work on prop-
erty rights and their effects on investment and consumption. North argues that the
development and enforcement of private property rights was a key factor allowing
for economic growth in early modern Europe. Property rights and the institutions
that enforce them create incentives for investment by preventing arbitrary seizures
of property by the state. Drawing on North, others have noted the empirical rela-
tionship between state property takings and subsequent wasteful use of property
(Arneson 1987; Williams 1998).
Military conscription is one type of a general class of property takings. Land,
personal possessions, natural resources, and even education and training generally
constitute the deﬁnition of ‘‘property.’’ When compensation for military service is
at ‘‘market value,’’ including the cost of hedging against the risk of death, con-
scription is not necessary because the needed quantity of soldiers enlist voluntarily.
As the risk associated with military service rises, states with volunteer armies often
raise their compensation packages or reduce the barriers to entry into the military
labor market to meet recruitment goals (Miles 2006). When paying market com-
pensation rates, states face incentives to employ soldiers with greater care, given
the substantial investment in each soldier. This translates into better training for
volunteer soldiers as well as their more cautious use on the battleﬁeld. Well-trained
volunteers are valuable and scarce. As a result, states are less likely to expend them
in suicide missions or to adopt Verdun-like attrition strategies. Market mechanisms
make volunteer replacement costs too high, which in turn results in lower overall
casualties for volunteer armies. Absent the incentives to extract the most output
from each of its soldiers, states with conscript armies will generally place the sol-
diers at greater risk than they would otherwise, thereby increasing casualty rates.5
A state that fails to invest in its soldiers at rates that would be necessary under a
volunteer system of recruitment will therefore put them at greater risk than they
would be otherwise6, which explains the reduced casualties of volunteer armies.
5 It is important to note the way that the quality of reserve armies could inﬂuence casualties as well. The gap
between reservists in a volunteer army and those in a conscription army, especially if the conscript term is long, may
be reasonably small. Thus, wars that require mobilizing reserves (or the National Guard in the United States) may
lead to smaller differences in performance. Unfortunately, we lack the data to test this point, but it is an important
issue for future research. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
6 One could respond that those who select themselves into the military are simply better suited to war ﬁghting.
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We argue that the differences in casualties for volunteer and conscript armies
result in large part from the recruiting strategy itself, not an antecedent selection
process.
Hypothesis 1a: Conscription armies should suffer heavier casualties than volunteer
armies.
Regime Type Perspective
A growing body of literature in international relations has expanded on the initial
insight that democracies rarely ﬁght each other to develop competing theories of
the relationship between domestic politics, political institutions, and the character
of international conﬂict (Levy 1989; Lake 1992; Russett 1993). Key assumptions
that underscore this line of thinking, which leads to hypotheses about democratic
states generally and democratic war initiators speciﬁcally, include the desire by all
leaders to stay in ofﬁce and the unique challenges to leaders and decision making
posed by electoral accountability (Russett and Oneal 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002;
Bueno de Mesquita 2003).
Because democracies are typically more accountable to the general public than
other types of regimes, civilian commanders of democratic militaries are more
subject to ﬂuctuations in popular will (Bennett and Stam 1998). Chiozza and
Goemans (2004), as well as Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992), argue
that the outcomes of foreign policy decisions inﬂuence the fate of the regime.7 Due
to this linkage between public consent and military strategy, democratic states may
adopt more cautious battleﬁeld strategies. Koch and Gartner (2005:889–890) argue
that issues surrounding the use of military force, especially casualties, affect the
possibility of re-election for legislators. They also ﬁnd no relationship between
whether a state used conscription and the probability that it takes casualties.8
Mueller (2005) links rising American casualties in the Korean War, Vietnam
War, and Iraq War to declining public approval for the war in question. For
example, rising public dissent during the Vietnam War, according to Mueller, led
President Lyndon Johnson to end his re-election campaign.9 In contrast, Feaver
and Gelpi (2004) and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reiﬂer (2005) argue that public support
for war in the United States depends less on casualties per se than clear progress
toward victory. In their view, if a war is going poorly, casualty tolerance (relative
to other similarly situated states) should drop dramatically. More recently, Gartner
(2008) ﬁnds that upward trending casualties over a period of months exert a
stronger drag on approval for wars than casualties in isolation.10 Reiter and Stam
(2002) attribute the apparently greater relative capability of democratic targets not
to heightened morale or material capabilities, but to superior leadership and
initiative on the battleﬁeld. According to Reiter and Stam, democratic political
culture and social value systems, stressing individualism and the de-centralization
of decision-making authority, are associated with more effective battleﬁeld
practices and hence lower casualties.11
7 Chiozza and Goemans (2004) do make a somewhat distinct argument about how regime type inﬂuences the
way leaders treat warfare, since war affects the probability a leader is removed from ofﬁce differently in different types
of regimes.
8 Interestingly, they do ﬁnd that states with conscription militaries are more likely to engage in disputes. How-
ever, Koch and Gartner (2005:887–888) tested whether casualties occur at all, not the relative level of casualties. See
also Klarevas (2002).
9 Larson and others at RAND have also done important work in this area (Larson 1996; Larson and Savych
2005).
10 This builds on Gartner and Segura (1998).
11 This view of democratic war performance is not without critics (Desch 2002; Downes 2009).
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Autocracies may believe that heightened audience costs in democracies, due to
the public consent constraint, will be a potential source of weakness. Filson and
Werner (2004) ﬁnd that despite democracies’ relatively higher likelihood of victory
in war, they are subject to challenges from nondemocracies who believe that
democracies will back down. This leads to a number of conﬂicts where autocracies
apparently incorrectly evaluate the costs of war by underestimating democratic
resolve, resulting in autocratic defeat.
Hypothesis 2a: Democratic armies should have lower casualties than autocratic
militaries.
Some argue that democracies’ peculiar advantages are only evident when they
are war initiators. Siverson (1995) links Mueller’s casualty aversion thesis to
democracies’ superior ability to choose which wars to ﬁght. But unlike Mueller,
his argument is an ex-ante evaluation of whether to go to war, not an ex-post
decision to keep ﬁghting. If the democratic constraint argument is true, democ-
racies should only initiate those wars they are likely to win at costs acceptable
to domestic constituencies. Siverson ﬁnds that battle deaths for democratic initi-
ators, as a proportion of their total population (not total army size), are sub-
stantially lower than that of democratic targets or nondemocratic initiators or
targets. This implies that democracies must ﬁnd ways to sustain lower casualty
levels during sustained engagements, as the constraints imposed by public
participation necessitate lower casualty numbers than might be acceptable in
other types of regimes.
Hypothesis 2b: Democratic initiators should have lower casualties than democratic
targets and autocratic militaries.
A related question is whether democratic states will employ conscripts or volun-
teers more cautiously, especially in relation to autocracies. While both the battle-
ﬁeld superiority and the audience costs approaches suggest that democracies will
take lower casualties on the battleﬁeld than autocracies, the audience costs per-
spective leads to speciﬁc predictions about the way democratic conscript armies
are likely to perform. Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that countries with broad se-
lectorates (the size of the group selecting the next political executive) face different
resource mobilization challenges than those with more narrow selectorates. More
representative states ‘‘seek gains primarily in the form of public goods,’’ such as
foreign policy success, which has beneﬁts that are not diluted by the large size of
the selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2004:364). Mili-
tary recruitment is a logical extension of Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s discussion of
differential tax burdens, since military recruitment strategies are part of how the
state distributes the costs of war. This suggests that states with broad selectorates
who employ conscript armies will try to minimize the ‘‘costs’’ to the selectorate, in
the form of casualties, just as these states try to minimize the tax burdens on the
selectorate.12
Hypothesis 2c: Democratic conscript armies will have the lowest casualties.
It is also likely that the stakes of a war affect states’ casualty sensitivity. The more
a war threatens the territorial integrity or autonomy of a state, the more willing it
should be to take casualties. When the regime itself is threatened, essentially, political
limits to casualty sensitivity should wane. When state survival is at risk, the domestic
political costs for taking casualties should be at their lowest.
12 This hypothesis is similar to Vasquez’s ﬁndings.
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In cases where the stakes in the war involve national survival, such as Belgium
in World War I, democratic states should be willing to take high casualties even in
a losing effort. It is in wars of choice that a combination of high casualties and
perceived failure appears to drive down democratic states’ ability to sustain sup-
port for the war. For example, as referenced earlier, Feaver and Gelpi argue that
the American public is relatively tolerant of high casualties when it feels that the
state’s war aims are being accomplished or when victory is at hand. They ‘‘ﬁnd
that beliefs about the likelihood of success matter most in determining the public’s
willingness to tolerate US military deaths in combat’’ (Gelpi et al. 2005:8). In their
view, it is when military operations appear to be failing that sustained casualties
reduce public support for war, though their results are limited to the United States
and they do think stakes matter.13
Since they govern based on the consent of the people, democracies may also try
harder in wars—they are more willing to invest the resources necessary to prevail
(Lake 1992; Gartzke 2001; Bueno de Mesquita 2003). This general tendency should
be pronounced in the biggest wars. Democratic targets, when ﬁghting for state sur-
vival or autonomy, should be generally willing to absorb exceptionally high casu-
alty rates regardless of manpower policy. Since conscript armies may become more
likely as the size of the war increases (though they are likely to exist even in smal-
ler wars), democratic conscript armies may be especially casualty prone and willing
to continue ﬁghting. Especially if Vasquez is correct, it may also be harder to build
support for wars fought by democratic conscript armies. Thus, the wars they do
ﬁght should be those that a huge segment of the population supports: the larger
wars where national interests appear clearly at stake and large numbers of casual-
ties are more likely.
Hypothesis 2d: Conscript armies, including democratic ones, will have high casualties
when participating in existential wars.
Data and Research Design
Research Design
We test our hypotheses with a new data set. We extended the Correlates of
War data set to include wars from 1816 to 2001 by adding wars in Armenia ⁄
Azerbaijan, the Congo, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.14 We construct the data set
with one observation per country per war. In cases where wars have multiple
fronts, the wars are broken up by front (or in some cases, campaign), so that
we can measure the independent interaction of national militaries.15 The result-
ing data set contains 98 wars ⁄ campaigns and 309 total war-participant observa-
tions. The dependent variable is the number of fatal casualties a given war-
participant suffered in the war. For wars prior to 1900, we draw on the COW
interstate war data set for casualty ﬁgures; for the twentieth century, when pos-
sible, we use the newly developed Uppsala ⁄PRIO data set and data gathered by
the authors (primarily Clodfelter 2002; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). We use
campaign-speciﬁc data whenever possible.16
13 In the context of Feaver and Gelpi’s claims about the facts that inﬂuenced American public support for the US
war in Iraq, support may depend on both the stakes and the probability of victory.
14 We derived these additional wars from the MIDs data set or elsewhere as containing a use of force and having
more than 1,000 casualties.
15 For example, World War I is broken up by participant and front as follows: WWIa, Belgium and Germany;
WWIb, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Turkey; WWIc, Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Turkey, and USA (Reiter and Stam 2003).
16 If unavailable, the data are coded as missing and dropped from the analysis.
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The two key independent variables of interest are the military recruitment strat-
egy of the war-participant and its regime type. We coded the military recruitment
variable a 0 if the military is fully volunteer for the duration of the war; otherwise,
it is coded a 1. Original research on national militaries was supplemented with
data gathered from other sources (Devi and Smythe 1968; Keegan 1983; Horeman
et al. 1998; Choi and James 2003; Toronto 2005). There are 23 missing observa-
tions. Prior to 1900, most of the missing data are concentrated among Central
American countries and small German-speaking states. In the twentieth century,
most of the missing values are found among emerging Middle Eastern and East
Asian states.17
As described elsewhere, the decision by states to employ conscription militar-
ies so frequently is a bit of a puzzle. We would expect that countries facing
large wars would select conscription militaries, while others would have volun-
teer militaries, but that is typically not the case. While volunteer armies have
become more frequent in recent years, of the ‘‘volunteer’’ observations in the
data, 30% are from the pre-World War II era, showing that the phenomenon
is not just a recent development. Since the modal army, regardless of war sever-
ity, is a conscript army, it means countries most commonly select conscription
regardless of expectations of casualties.
The regime type variable ranges from 0 to 20, based on a transposed version
of the Polity IV data set. Zero represents the most autocratic regimes, and 20,
the most democratic. The bargaining and war literature suggests that there
should be observable selection effects in the distribution of casualties for war-
participants. Democratic regimes should select into particularly low-cost wars of
relatively short duration (Slantchev 2004), meaning the casualties they suffer
may appear relatively low, even though they are not less willing to take casual-
ties than autocracies under other conditions (see also Powell 2002; Reiter 2004).
Slantchev’s argument implies that it is essential to control for whether a state
initiates the war or is attacked. We therefore code ‘‘Initiation’’ ‘‘0’’ when a war-
participant is a target and ‘‘1’’ when it is an initiator. We rely on the COW
and MID codings for initiation.18
Control Variables
We are primarily interested in testing the relative importance of military recruit-
ment strategies and regime type in predicting casualties in war. It is necessary,
however, to control for other factors that may inﬂuence wartime casualties and
that are likely correlated with the variables of interest and errors therein.19 We
include controls for the terrain (Terrain) on which most of the battles in a war
took place and the strategy (Strategy: mobile, attrition, punishment) each side
employed during the war. We updated Stam’s (1996) codings to incorporate the
post-1991 wars.20
17 There are differences between impressments, national service, and a draft. Our theory predicts the differences
between all types of conscription militaries and volunteer militaries, so the grouping should not inﬂuence the results.
This is an area for future research, however. In mixed armies, the size of the conscript force generally swamps that of
the volunteer component, meaning that decisions about the use of force will be more like a conscription army. While
it might be interesting to look at particular service differences, it is important to establish ﬁrst that military recruit-
ment matters at all.
18 We code members of the initiating coalition as initiators rather than creating a separate ‘‘joiner’’ category
(Bennett and Stam 2000). This is most relevant in the Korean, Vietnam, Kosovo, and Afghanistan Wars.
19 Our results are also consistent without control variables (Achen 2005).
20 See Appendix S1 for more on these variables. The strategy variable is ordinal to ensure consistency with prior
research by Stam (1996), Reiter and Stam (2002), and others. Breaking it down into dummies also severely reduces the
available degrees of freedom given the universe of the data. Therefore, we kept the strategy variable in a form consis-
tent with previous research.
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We also control for the size of and spending on the participating armies (Prewar
Army Size and Military Spending) with data from the COW Material Capabilities
data set (Ghosn and Palmer 2003).21 To control for the possibility that our results
are an artifact of the high-intensity engagements of the World Wars, we added a
World Wars control for war-participants in fronts of either World War.22 This is
important to show that our ﬁndings are robust for the vast majority of wars and
not driven by exceptional conﬂicts like World War I and World War II. Finally,
we control for the wars’ durations in days to control for the ongoing risk of
becoming a casualty (Duration). We present basic descriptive statistics for each
variable in Table 1.23
In our test of the property takings hypothesis, we are interested in questions of
force employment—the ways that a country ⁄military commits its forces in battle
(Biddle 2004). This presumes that the decision to ﬁght has already occurred since
we are dealing with the population of states at war.24 Conscription and volunteer
armies, because of the market payment differential, should experience different
levels of casualty sensitivity, leading volunteer armies to be less prone to taking
casualties than conscription armies. The drawback of our approach is that it does
not account for armies that use massive force to achieve their objectives; it also
ignores improvements in battleﬁeld medicine that create higher wounded-in-action
and lower killed-in-action rates over time.25 We assume that more capable
militaries are better able to achieve those same objectives with lower casualties.26
A simple correlation analysis of the variables suggests that the relationship
between casualties and conscription is positive but small. The effects of democracy
are similarly low, but in the opposite direction. The relationship between casualties
and duration conﬁrms what we intuitively expect: casualty levels increase with war
duration.27
Statistical Model
The data-generating process for the dependent variable (battleﬁeld casualties)
is fundamentally a discrete count process. We therefore want to use a count
model to evaluate the factors systematically associated with the differences in
21 Adding a control for relative capabilities, whether measured by total material capabilities or just army size and
military spending, does not affect the results. For data availability reasons, the army size and military spending data
are not broken down by campaign. That is most relevant in the small number of cases where a country is ﬁghting a
two-front war. Optimally, while we would like to have troop counts for numbers engaged in a speciﬁc campaign, that
data are not available. Using the COW prewar army size variable also makes our results consistent with other quanti-
tative conﬂict research, which also often uses this variable. However, that is an important limitation to our results.
The military spending variables include appropriate monetary adjustments as described in the COW National Material
Capabilities documentation, available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org.
22 For robustness purposes, we also ran separate versions of all models excluding those observations. We then
tried different speciﬁcations, including adding dummies for the Korean and Vietnam Wars and substituting controls
for war-participants with more than 500,000 casualties or more than 100,000 casualties. None changed the results.
23 We add a series of economic controls when conducting additional robustness tests. We describe these tests
below.
24 See Vasquez (2005) for a detailed discussion of the effects of conscription on the nature of lower level disputes.
25 To ensure comparability with existing research, we do not include a battleﬁeld medicine control. For this
variable to bias our results, it would have to both have differential effects on the two sides in a particular war
and be uncorrelated with our variables of interest. A potential proxy would be each side’s prewar life expectancy,
but data issues limited our ability to compensate for this factor. Moreover, any correlation between improving
medical care and the variables of interest is likely offset by similar trends during the same periods in increasing
weapons’ lethality.
26 As described below, to control for the impact of technology over time, we ran a model with a year and year
squared variable. It did not change the results.
27 While we would like to control for forces actually engaged in combat and look at tooth-to-tail ratios, gathering
that data on a large scale is nearly impossible. As described earlier in note 25, our data and model are comparable
with previous research.
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casualties across wars, leading us to consider ﬁtting our data to both Poisson
and negative binomial distributions.28 We reject the Poisson model because its
restrictive assumption of means–variance equality is inappropriate for the data.
Furthermore, there is little reason to assume that a constant arrival rate (as
measured in the Poisson parameter lambda) underlies the data-generating pro-
cess here. As Cameron and Trivedi note, ‘‘(f)ailure of the Poisson assumption
of equidispersion has similar qualitative consequences to failure of the assump-
tion of homoskedasticity in the linear regression model. But the magnitude of
the effect on reported standard errors and t statistics can be much larger’’
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998:77).
We use the generalized negative binomial model for our regression
analysis because there is overdispersion, meaning there is a large amount of vari-
ance in our data. This makes sense given the large differences in casualties from
war to war. It is identical in functional form as the standard negative binomial,
but allows one to further parameterize the dispersion term to account for the vari-
ation in casualties. The standard setup for the negative binomial is:
yi  Poisson ðkiÞ
ki ¼ expðxibþ uiÞ
expðuiÞ  Gammað1=a; aÞ
The generalized form of the model allows us to vary alpha systematically:
a ¼ expðzi cÞ
One can think of this parameterization as estimating the variance as a func-
tion of a particular set of parameters. This allows us to estimate unbiased
parameters for conscription and democracy, even though we expect the underly-
ing casualty rate to vary within groups created by states’ strategy choices (Win-
kelmann 2008). Explicitly modeling the variance via the dispersion term allows
us to control for those factors that we expect would increase the mean and var-
iance, the factors besides the main variables of interest that may inﬂuence the
variance of the data’s distribution as well as the mean level of casualties (Hilbe
2007). For example, wars fought in an open plain might be very quick with a
blitzkrieg strategy or very long with an attrition strategy (think France in WWI
and WWII). On the other hand, mountainous wars are less likely to have such
variation.
These factors may vary by war or by participant within a given war. By model-
ing these factors as part of the dispersion term, we are better able to make com-
parisons of the effect on the mean level of casualties based solely on regime type
28 We use a count model rather than logging our variables and running an OLS regression for three reasons. First,
since we actually have a good account of the dependent variable, using a count variable is best because it does not
throw away any of the data (King 1989b; Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Second, our data are zero truncated, meaning
there are 0s present in the data. Log transforming count data when there are 0s present in the data forces us to skew
the dependent variable (by adding a value like 1 or something else). The ad hoc nature of that decision, according to
King, ‘‘introduces arbitrarily large biases into the analysis’’ when analyzing international relations data (King
1989a:126). Even adding only a 1 or other small number when transforming the data can signiﬁcantly alter the sub-
stantive conclusions of a model (King 1988:846–849). Third, empirical research in other ﬁelds suggests that, because
log transforming count data fundamentally changes the nature of the data from a discrete to a continuous distribu-
tion, it often leads to inappropriate conclusions, especially in cases where the dispersion is large, which it is in this case
(O’Hara and Kotze 2010:9). As O’Hara and Kotze conclude, ‘‘For count data, our results suggest that transformations
perform poorly and instead statistical procedures designed to deal with counts should be used, that is, methods for ﬁt-
ting Poisson or negative binomial models to data’’ (O’Hara and Kotze 2010:9). However, re-estimating our results
with a logged casualties variable and logging the other appropriate variables produces the same substantive results.
For replication information, please contact the authors.
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and recruitment strategy. Here, c is a vector of coefﬁcients for the zi variables,
which we consider control variables.29
Results
First, we present the results of the simple rank order relationship between regime
type, conscription, and initiation. These results provide the most stripped down
picture of the relationship we are trying to test.
These simple correlations provide initial support for our theoretical arguments,
especially by demonstrating that volunteer armies systematically outperform con-
scription armies. However, it is also important to test this simple data with regres-
sion analysis to conﬁrm that these simple results hold up. Model 1 in Table 3
displays our ﬁrst cut, with controls, at the relationship between conscription and
casualties estimated with our multivariate generalized negative binomial model.30
Model 1 provides support for our conscription hypothesis. The positive sign on
the conscription variable indicates that conscription armies suffer higher casualties.
Neither the initiation variable nor the regime type variables achieve statistical
signiﬁcance at conventional levels. This suggests that, at an initial glance, they
might not actually have a large inﬂuence on casualties after all. The simplest test,
a cross-tab, and the simplest statistical model support our core hypothesis and
contribution—the importance of military recruitment systems—but do not support
the other hypotheses. Next, we look in more detail at the interactive relationship
between regime type, war initiation, and conscription policies. One implication of
the democratic selection and war-ﬁghting arguments is that the true effect of dem-
ocratic institutions may lie in the interaction of the primary variables of interest.
In Model 2 of Table 3, we include the interactive terms needed to address the joint
effects of democracy, conscription, and initiation.
The results of Model 2 are difﬁcult to interpret directly. Braumoeller (2004)
shows the necessity of including more than just the interactions of interest. The
inclusion of the necessary higher- and lower-order terms renders the coefﬁcients
themselves uninformative.31 We therefore turn toward more substantive tests
designed to show how the interacted relationship works.
TABLE 2. Rank Order Relationship between Regime Type, Conscription, and Initiation
Rank (based
on mean) Observations Minimum Mean
Volunteer democratic targets (VDT) 1 4 218 475.5
Volunteer autocratic targets (VAT) 3 5 28 1258.8
Volunteer democratic initiators (VDI) 2 19 0 1289.895
Volunteer autocratic initiators (VAI) 4 9 0 2820.556
Conscript democratic initiators (CDI) 5 23 0 15,013.61
Conscript autocratic initiators (CAI) 6 43 0 99,544.98
Conscript democratic targets (CDT) 7 26 10 114,043
Conscript autocratic targets (CAT) 8 38 100 378,815.3
(Notes. Autocracy set at Polity20 £ 3. Democracy set at Polity20 ‡ 17.)
29 We also considered using matching, but found it inappropriate for two reasons. First, since we already face lim-
itations on the number of observations, matching would restrict our sample to such a degree that it would undermine
conﬁdence in the results. Second, we use the simple statistical evidence presented in Table 2 to show how the results
vary based on different categories.
30 As described earlier, the results are the same excluding controls. The results are also consistent excluding the
initiation variable as well and with alternative speciﬁcations of the initiation variable.
31 Omitting lower-order interaction terms is equivalent to assuming the coefﬁcients are equal to zero; unless this
assumption is true, bias will be induced.
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We look ﬁrst at Model 2’s predicted values (Table 4). We generate predicted val-
ues based on permutations of the variables of interest (with other variables held at
their means).32 This table presents the simulated casualties we would expect the
states in question to suffer while controlling for other military factors also associ-
ated with casualty levels.
Controlling for a variety of other factors known to affect casualty rates, Table 4
shows that volunteer armies systematically suffer fewer casualties than conscrip-
tion armies. For example, conscript autocratic initiators suffer over ﬁve times as
many casualties as their volunteer counterparts, while conscript democratic targets
take over thirteen times as many casualties as volunteer democratic targets. This
provides strong support for the property takings argument, demonstrating that
states appear to utilize their military ‘‘resources’’ less wastefully when market
mechanisms are used to select soldiers into the military. These results hold
whether we include outliers or with different speciﬁcations of the model. We
graphically display the data from Table 4 as well in two box plots available in
Appendix S2.
From the perspective of the literature, the strong evidence in favor of our prop-
erty takings argument is important. Our results contradict James and Choi’s ﬁnd-
ings as well as Vasquez’s. We believe that three factors account for the differences
in our empirical results and Vasquez’s: we provide a more explicit theoretical per-
spective, we execute an improved research design, and we focus our analysis on
wars rather than including hundreds of low-level disputes with few, if any, casual-
ties. Regarding the ﬁrst point, Vasquez’s argument about the representative nature
of conscription armies largely relies on an implicit audience cost perspective that is
ambiguous with regard to the speciﬁc relationship between casualties and conscrip-
tion. Our property takings argument draws a much more explicit link between a
state’s recruitment strategy and battleﬁeld casualty levels than Vasquez’s more
implicit argument. Second, our data structure and research design are better able
to capture the effects of regime type and conscription on casualties. Vasquez relies
on a modiﬁed MID data set, which both artiﬁcially decreases his standard errors
and swamps the effect of the larger interstate wars (on which we focus our analy-
sis). This obscures the true effect of conscription during times of war. Vasquez’s
TABLE 4. Predicted Values of Interactive Model Controlling for Duration, Army Size, Strategy, and
Military Spending
Excluding Outliers Full Dataset
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Volunteer Autocratic Initiators (VAI) 5542 8110 38,647 99,237
Volunteer Democratic Targets (VDT) 6480 9484 44,806 115,054
Volunteer Democratic Initiators (VDI) 11,080 16,217 74,501 191,304
Conscript Democratic Initiators (CDI) 16,596 24,290 67,466 173,241
Volunteer Autocratic Targets (VAT) 19,638 28,743 152,683 392,060
Conscript Autocratic Initiators (CAI) 32,129 47,023 178,749 458,993
Conscript Autocratic Targets (CAT) 36,505 53,428 299,422 768,859
Conscript Democratic Targets (CDT) 156,166 228,561 215,477 553,3304
(Notes. Autocracy set at Polity 20 £ 3. Democracy set at Polity 20 ‡ 17. Full distribution of values graphically dis-
played in Figures 2 and 3.)
32 We calculated the predicted values in Table 4 and for Figures 2 and 3 by specifying the particular variable val-
ues at each point and then using the predicted standard deviation drawn from the ‘‘predict’’ command in Stata. This
is similar to the procedures described by Brambor et al., among others (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Kam and
Franzese 2007). As such, the predicted values are not generated using N random draws but they are, however, an
accurate representation of the variance surrounding each point prediction. Given the difﬁculty of interpretation due to
our use of interaction terms, it is important not to overemphasize these simulated substantive results.
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data set only contains cases through 1985, omitting several wars with participation
by volunteer armies. The functional form of our model, the generalized negative
binomial, better reﬂects the data-generating process. Finally, the inclusion of the
Uppsala ⁄Prio data has vastly improved the completeness and accuracy of the bat-
tleﬁeld casualties measure.33
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate our ﬁnding that volunteer armies do especially well
regardless of regime type.34 For example, volunteer autocratic initiators do espe-
cially well, taking fewer casualties than any other combination of regime type,
initiation, and military recruitment method. While our general ﬁndings on con-
scription versus volunteer armies are stable, as are our regime type ﬁndings, the
small numbers of observations in some of the categories—especially the autocratic
volunteer categories—suggest that these results are somewhat tentative. For more
on this issue, dealing with speciﬁc states, see Appendix S2.
The paucity of volunteer autocratic initiators points to a broader issue: the difﬁ-
culty autocratic states have raising volunteer armies. Many citizens do not consider
autocratic governments to be legitimate. As a result, it is potentially more difﬁcult
for them to inspire the type of loyalty and devotion that is necessary to recruit
large numbers of volunteers. It also may be more difﬁcult for autocratic states to
pay soldiers market-clearing wages—since they do not regard their subjects as
equal, they are less likely to think they should have to compensate them appropri-
ately for their military service. This is one reason why many autocratic states
with volunteer armies before the nineteenth century relied heavily on mercenaries.
Autocratic states with volunteer units, such as the late eighteenth-century armies
of Frederick the Great, are historical exceptions.
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FIG 2. Marginal Effect of Conscription on Casualties for Initiating States as Regime Type Varies
33 Appendix S2 addresses the relationship between our ﬁndings and Choi and James (2003).
34 As described in note 32, we generated the ﬁgures using predicted values from a modiﬁed version of Model 2,
Table 3. The ﬁgures are modiﬁed to exclude outlier cases, cases with more than 1,000,000 casualties, in an attempt to
show what the graphical relationship looks like for more typical wars.
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Several of our categories are statistically indistinguishable, as indicated by the
convergence shown at several points in Figures 2 and 3. We can, however, distin-
guish among four groups of states and retain our conﬁdence in the lower casualty
levels associated with volunteer armies. While volunteer democratic initiators
(VDI), volunteer autocratic initiators (VAI), and volunteer democratic targets
(VDT) are statistically indistinguishable from one another, they all suffer substan-
tially fewer casualties than the states with other institutional arrangements. The
next two types of states with the lowest casualties are volunteer autocratic targets
(VAT) and conscript democratic initiators (CDI). Two of the three most costly (in
terms of human costs to their own armies) producers of military force are con-
scripting autocracies, both targets and initiators (CDT and CDI). Conscript demo-
cratic targets (CDT) suffer substantially higher casualties than all other groups.35
The results do not afford such easy comparisons of democracies and autocracies.
As noted earlier, the ﬁrst of these pairs—volunteer initiators (VDI and VAI)—is
statistically indistinguishable. We do note, however, that the subsequent two
pairs—volunteer targets (VDT and VAT) and conscript initiators (CDI and
CAI)—provide support for the regime type hypothesis that democracies should
suffer lower casualties than authoritarian states. Both pairs have statistically signif-
icant differences between the estimated means. However, it is clear that the last
pair—conscript targets (CDT and CAT)—offers no support for the initial regime
type hypothesis that democracies should systematically suffer fewer casualties. In
fact, it strongly suggests that under these conditions, autocracies take substantially
fewer casualties.
As a target state’s regime type becomes increasingly democratic, the associated
costs of conscription rise dramatically. For democratic war initiators, there appears
to be little difference in aggregate casualties between conscript armies and
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FIG 3. Marginal Effect of Conscription on Casualties for Target States as Regime Type Varies
35 Signiﬁcant t-tests scores verify these differences.
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volunteer ones. The ﬁnding that democracies suffer fewer casualties holds even
when we include controls for state size, winning, and other factors.36 These results
are generally consistent with the broader literature on democracies at war.
We now return to Hypothesis 2d and the circumstances under which democra-
cies have been willing and ⁄or able to sustain high levels of casualties relative
to historical means. We theorize that these situations are most likely to occur
during wars of state survival and that democracies will be disproportionately
likely to take casualties in these situations and to employ conscription.37 The
results support Hypothesis 2d. Democratic targets utilizing conscription to
generate their military forces are the only instance in which the results for
similarly situated democratic and autocratic states (both conscripting targets)
show a signiﬁcant ‘‘advantage’’ for the autocratic state. One could argue that the
performance of Holland (56,344 casualties) and Belgium (27,460 casualties) in
World War II in the face of the German onslaught probably explains this
result.38 Both countries were woefully overmatched by German panzer divisions
and as a result, both took heavy casualties. The category also includes the
successful Israeli military operations in 1948 and 1973, when Israel survived
attacks by a set of Arab nations and even gained territory in some cases. Israel
lost approximately 6,000 troops in the 1948 war and about 3,000 in the 1973
war. However, the median casualties for conscripting democratic targets are
35,000, the highest of any of the eight categories. All American casualties in
World War II, for example, fall into the category of a democratic target with
conscription.
We systematically test this proposition in Model 3 of Table 3. We added a
binary Existential variable that measures whether a given conﬂict represented an
existential war for the target state and included it to estimate how participation in
these wars inﬂuences the results. We also interacted the Existential variable
with our regime type variable, polity20.39 The variable is 1 if the autonomy and
sovereignty of a state are threatened and a 0 otherwise. Figure 4, based on Model
3, highlights the unique way that wars of survival loosen the constraints on casu-
alty taking in democracies. Democracies start behaving more like autocracies, in
terms of casualty taking, in wars of survival.40
Our results point to the stakes involved in the conﬂict as a critical factor in
determining democratic states’ willingness to sustain high casualty levels. To test
whether it is the war outcome driving the results, we also estimated a model that
included a ‘‘war outcomes’’ control that is a 2 if the participant won the war, a
1 if the war was a draw and a 0 otherwise (based on Stam 1996). Including a war
outcomes control does not alter the substantive results of the model.
The highest absolute casualty levels for conscript democratic targets are France
and Britain in World War I and the United States in World War II, wars of the
highest stakes, showing that democratic states are willing to sustain their efforts
36 Adding the population of a state, its urban population, or war outcomes into the model or the exposure term
did not change the results.
37 Since we cannot directly measure casualty aversion, the tests of Hypothesis 2d comprise our best attempt to
deal with this important issue. Future research should attempt to account more directly for national variations in casu-
alty sensitivity.
38 It is possible that the especially strong performance, according to some analysts, of Germany in wars between
1816 and 1945 could skew the results in that countries facing Germany might have especially high casualty rates. Con-
trolling for German targets with a dummy did not alter the results.
39 We coded the variable using available secondary sources, especially Holsti (1991). We attempted to add the
existential war variable to our main interaction term and include all of the relevant subinteractions but collinearity
and degrees of freedom problems forced us to turn to a more simple interaction with our regime type variable.
40 We used predicted values from Model 3 in Table 2 to generate Figure 4, as described in note 32. Including an
interactive term of polity*victory does not improve the overall ﬁt of the model to the data, nor is the interactive term
statistically signiﬁcant. Bennett and Stam (1998) show that in smaller wars, taking large numbers of casualties over
time decreases the probability of success for democracies.
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and take high levels of casualties in important wars. Almost all of the highest-casu-
alty democratic target states are either targets of Germany in the World Wars or
other democratic targets that risked substantial loss of territory or autonomy. This
suggests that national interest or the issues at stake in the war are the primary
factors affecting democratic states’ willingness to take high levels of casualties. The
signiﬁcance of our existential variable despite the World Wars control described
earlier also suggests that our ﬁnding has broader robustness and is not just an
artifact of the World Wars.
The high casualty levels sustained by CDT also provide additional evidence
against Vasquez’s argument that because democratic conscript armies are more
likely to include the children of elites, audience costs will serve to prevent those
armies from taking high levels of casualties.41 Instead, our results provide indirect
empirical support to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2004) selectorate theory of
domestic institutions. The ﬁnding that democratic conscript targets, especially in
wars of survival, are willing to take large numbers of casualties may show the way
states and their populations update expectations and strategy during wars. In
shorter wars, the desire to reduce the impact of the war on the broader population
should cause states with large selectorates to focus on reducing casualties. How-
ever, in longer wars, especially wars for the existence of the state, updating by
leaders means they will spend more lives because they are still focused on achieving
the public good of victory.42
The empirical evidence presented earlier also shows that when the stakes are
high and wars are lengthy, democratic states are willing to commit high amounts
of labor in addition to capital—though they still might be comparatively more cap-
ital intensive than autocratic armies (Lake 1992; Gartzke 2001). Additionally, we
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FIG 4. The Relationship Between War Type, Democracy, and Casualties
41 There is also the potential for inequality after selection into the military in conscript armies, with the children
of elites being assigned to military occupational specialties that decrease the risk of actual combat, like stafﬁng or
logistics. We observe this in the European theaters of both World Wars. It is also a potential issue with volunteer
armies. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
42 Personnel communication with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.
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control for the argument that large selectorate states (or democratic) will heavily
capitalize wars only through investing in proportionately greater ﬁnancial or mate-
riel resources. The military spending and personnel variables in the dispersion term
are the best available proxies for resource investment in warfare and do not alter
our results. Moreover, military spending is the operational measure used by Bueno
de Mesquita et al. (2004).
However, it is possible that these results ignore the way that wealthier states
might have advantages on the battleﬁeld through their adoption of new technol-
ogies and because of the way wealth might inﬂuence casualty sensitivity. In
addition, during the time period in question, from the early nineteenth century
through the early twenty-ﬁrst century, there were large advances in the technol-
ogy of warfare that made labor much more productive in general. Technologi-
cal change could also inﬂuence casualty rates by affecting casualty sensitivity.
For example, volunteer armies might not be more casualty sensitive due to mar-
ket mechanisms, but because leaders seek to protect the advanced technology,
they deploy with those smaller numbers of soldiers. This impact could increase
with wealth. To account for the way that technology, time, and wealth inﬂu-
ence the results, we added additional control variables and re-ran model 2 from
Table 3. The results are presented in models 4 and 5 of Table 3. First, we
include a variable measuring GDP per capita based primarily on Maddison’s
data, which includes accurate cross-national deﬂators, and a GDP per capita
squared variable designed to test whether the impact of GDP is linear, since
GDP may only matter up to a certain point (Singh and Way 2004; Eichengreen
and LeBlang 2008:320). Second, to test for whether wealthier nations that spend
more on their soldiers have different casualty rates, we added a measure of
spending per soldier by interacting the prewar army size variable and the mili-
tary spending variable. While far from perfect, this is one way to try to get at
the role of technology and wealth. Finally, to try to account for the increasing
effectiveness of technology over time, we added a variable for the year and year
squared, since there is a possibility that increasing technology has only cut
down on casualties up to a speciﬁc point.
The results show that while these factors may matter, as scholars like Gartzke
(2001) argue, decisions about military recruitment still play an important role in
inﬂuencing relative casualty levels. The conscription variable and relevant interac-
tion terms are signiﬁcant and in the predicted direction in models 4 and 5 just as
they are in the other models.43
A ﬁnal potential issue is that the theory does not separate willingness to take
casualties from battleﬁeld effectiveness. Volunteer armies might take fewer casual-
ties only because they are better at war ﬁghting, not because of whether they initi-
ated the war, whether it is a war for national survival, or issues related to regime
type. The War Outcomes control model described earlier takes into account this
possibility and including it does not alter the results.
Choosing a Military Labor Policy
Given the evidence presented previously about their inefﬁciency, why are there so
many conscript armies? The simple reason can be found in the takings argument.
Conscript armies are cheap, relying on the coercive power of the state to induce
participation rather than providing market-clearing inducements to raise the neces-
sary manpower. Another reason is that switching between military recruitment sys-
tems is a relatively rare event regardless of the strategic situation. Analyzing
Toronto’s (2005) data on recruitment systems in all states from 1816 to 2004 shows
43 Results from more models testing these factors are available in Appendix S3. Logging the GDP variables also
does not change the results.
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that countries keep their military recruitment system constant in 87% of country-
years. Moreover, since it is true that the largest of wars, World Wars I and II,
tended to feature the use of conscription by participants, we checked for the possi-
bility that states, in general, create conscription systems when they expect to ﬁght
especially large wars. We created lag variables from 1 to 10 years to see whether
states switched to a conscription system from a year before a war up through
10 years prior to a war. While some states might, in rare cases, face the constant
threat of imminent war over a 10-year period, generally the threat of war increases
just prior to the actual outbreak of war. If recruitment systems are endogenous to
casualties, we should see at least some evidence of ‘‘switching’’ as war becomes
more imminent. However, militaries kept the same recruitment system as the year
before the war 98% of the time, they kept the same recruitment system as 5 years
before the war 92% of the time, and they kept the same recruitment system as
10 years before the war 90% of the time. This suggests that, as Hadass (2004)
ﬁnds, most states try to optimize prior to a war using the recruitment system they
already have rather than switching systems. The stickiness of recruitment systems,
once adopted, also suggests that whether a military enters a conﬂict with a con-
scription or volunteer military is not just a function of rational expectations about
a speciﬁc upcoming conﬂict, but instead an indication of culturally and organiza-
tionally driven prior beliefs about what a military system is supposed to look
like.44
To test this possibility, we gathered data on the date of implementation and the
reason for implementation for a country’s military recruitment, which could vary
from expectations about war in general to beliefs about the speciﬁc war the coun-
try was ﬁghting to domestic politics, norms about recruitment systems, or other
factors.45 The results show that something other than speciﬁc beliefs about the war
a country was ﬁghting drove the decision to implement a recruitment system in
205 of 223 cases, or 92%. Furthermore, of the 18 cases in which switching may
have occurred for reasons related to expectations of casualties, 10 of them involve
World War I or World War II, such as Great Britain in World War I or the Uni-
ted States in World War II. Even in World War II, the canonical example of a
large war, not all participating militaries utilized conscription. The Polish Army
had a volunteer force throughout the buildup prior to the German invasion, a situ-
ation in which the risk of war was widely and well understood.
In many cases, the selection of military recruitment systems is a function of
domestic political culture and economics, as Kier’s (1997) study of French decision
making in the pre-World War II period shows. Organizationally driven beliefs
about warfare in general and the ‘‘best’’ system for building a strong army also
inﬂuence these decisions (Posen 1993). Domestic politics, learning from prior wars,
and bureaucratic norms regarding the optimal military recruitment system play a
larger role in determining the type of military recruitment system a country uses
than do expectations of future casualties in the mean case. In most cases, casualty
expectations are important for variations in army size within a system, not the sys-
tem itself. Therefore, though the instances of casualty expectations inﬂuencing
whether a state uses conscription or not are well known, like the British in World
War I, states facing war tend to optimize within the framework of their pre-exist-
ing military recruitment system, rather than changing systems.
As a ﬁnal statistical test, we ran instrumented models designed to test for the
link between military recruitment and casualties (Models 6 and 7 in Table 3).
44 This sort of learning could also inﬂuence the propensity of states to engage in large wars and take casualties,
though it probably inﬂuences whether states get involved in wars, rather than casualties once war begins. It is an inter-
esting point for future research.
45 We examined a signiﬁcant subset of the data—223 of the 309 observations in the data set. The complete data
and coding is available upon request from the authors.
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While the evidence described earlier shows that, as an empirical question, military
recruitment systems are relatively independent of casualties, these models reinforce
the robustness of our ﬁndings. Model 6 is a two-stage model where the dependent
variable in the outcome equation is the natural log of casualties, a continuous vari-
able. We instrument conscription, a binary variable, making it the dependent vari-
able in the selection equation. The speciﬁc mixed process, with a continuous
outcome variable and a binary (potentially) endogenous regressor, renders most
traditional instrumented tests very unstable. Therefore, we turn to a mixed-process
regression, which allows us to specify a regression process for the outcome equa-
tion (casualties) and independently specify the selection equation (conscription)
(Roodman 2007). We have to drop the interaction terms due to the complexity of
the model. Given that our hypotheses are speciﬁcally based on the interactions
between conscription, regime type, and initiation, this move also biases the results
against our theory.
We include several instruments, including total population, urban population,
and spending per soldier. None is statistically linked to higher or lower casualties
in our main model. Since spending per soldier is a valid instrument for conscrip-
tion, we have to shift its component parts, prewar army size, and military spend-
ing, out of the outcome equation and into the conscription equation. This also
increases the bar to signiﬁcance for the conscription variable since variables that
might only be partially independent are included as independent instruments in the
conscription equation. This output is conceptually identical to instrumented probit
or regression but more appropriate given the distribution of the dependent and in-
strumented variables. Conscription is still signiﬁcantly related to casualties and in
the predicted direction. Even if conscription is somewhat endogenous to expecta-
tions of casualties, the outcome equation shows that it exercises a signiﬁcant inde-
pendent and positive effect.
In Model 7, we estimated an Instrumented Probit model. We transform the
dependent variable again to ﬁt the model. Since the endogeneity concern is primar-
ily a concern about extreme values, we created a binary variable coded as a 1 if
casualties were above the 75th percentile for the casualties variable and a 0 other-
wise. The results show a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between conscription
and casualties. Moreover, the Wald test of exogeneity is not signiﬁcant, with a
value of 0.23, suggesting that the use of an instrumented model is not necessary
and the relationship is not endogenous. However, it is important to keep in mind
the limitations of this instrumented test given how much the dependent variable is
transformed from what we use elsewhere in Table 3.
Additionally, our data show that both democracies and autocracies have
employed conscription at various points, as have militaries in countries of varying
economic sizes and with different levels of military spending. While examples like
Britain in World War I demonstrate that some countries do alter recruitment sys-
tems as their expectations about wars change, prewar estimates of war duration
and intensity are often incorrect. For example, the United States vastly underesti-
mated the costs associated with its invasion of Iraq. Since countries frequently
mis-estimate war costs, expectations of war duration ⁄ intensity should not map
onto the recruitment system.
Based on theory, close analysis of the data, and the examples we provide, the
evidence implies an important interaction between recruitment systems, regime
type, and casualties in warfare. The next puzzle to solve is what drives the
adoption of different military recruitment systems. Our results are suggestive and a
ﬁrst step, rather than the ﬁnal word.46
46 One objection to these results is that the data disproportionately favor volunteer militaries because all militaries
use conscription when involved in large wars, so our ﬁndings are epiphenomenal. To some extent, we deal with this
objection above –military recruitment systems are reasonably exogenous to casualties.
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Finally, a critic could argue that states select themselves into wars and are
selected as targets in wars in part based on ex-ante observable characteristics.
States with conscription armies may select or be selected into especially risky wars
in which they are likely to suffer high levels of casualties since other states know
that volunteer armies are more capable. While it is true that states choose to initi-
ate wars in part on the basis of information about the quality of militaries, we
were unable to ﬁnd evidence that perceptions of a recruitment system as voluntary
versus conscript inﬂuenced perceptions of military quality in a way that was signiﬁ-
cantly biased against conscription armies. If anything, the relationship worked the
opposite way from the early nineteenth century, following the Napoleonic innova-
tion of the levee en masse, through the mid-twentieth century. In that period, hav-
ing a conscription system was a precondition to mass mobilization, considered the
optimal form of military mobilization and a strong signal of army quality (Posen
1993; Herrera and Mahnken 2003).
Additionally, conscripting initiators, both autocratic and especially democratic
states, actually suffer much lower relative levels of casualties than conscripting tar-
gets. The highest casualty levels for conscription armies actually tend to occur in
cases of conscripting targets, meaning the conscripting army did not select into a
particularly ‘‘risky’’ war; rather, they entered the war because another conscripting
army attacked them, most commonly.47
Conclusion
While military labor policy re-entered American politics in the last decade due to
the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, issues regarding the way the state
recruits soldiers into its armed forces have always been controversial. Any time cit-
izens die in the service of the state, questions will be raised about why they were
there in the ﬁrst place. This fact provides, in part, the justiﬁcation for relying on
citizen soldiers in democratic states that desire to retain strong civilian control of
the military. But beyond the politics lies a substantive question with important
academic implications for predicting military power and developing a more
nuanced understanding of the factors inﬂuencing the character of war.
This phenomenon shows up in other aspects of states’ defense policies as well.
As Kier’s work on the French military in the interwar period shows, France’s con-
scription policy helped produce a defensive military strategy that both contradicted
the offensive nature of their alliance commitments and was ill-suited to the type of
warfare for which Germany was apparently preparing (Kier 1997).48 In contrast to
Choi and James’ arguments, our results also show that there are several reasons to
think that volunteer militaries should suffer fewer casualties than conscript armies.
In brief, our evidence suggests that volunteer armies are more highly motivated
since they are made up of people who choose to serve. They also have lower turn-
over ratios. All of these things increase military readiness and effectiveness (Orvis
and Asch 2001; Wolfowitz 2003; Ofﬁce of the Undersecretary of Defense, Person-
nel, and Readiness 2006).49
In general, governments employing conscription armies tend to expose their sol-
diers to greater risk even when controlling for the relative size of the war under
observation. This is strong evidence in favor of our property takings argument.
Speciﬁcally, volunteer armies appear to more carefully allocate and expend their
resources, and because military leaders adapt their wartime strategies to the
47 Finally, even if conscription armies select into risky wars, it is consistent with the claim that recruitment strate-
gies play a major role in inﬂuencing military strategy and international politics, supporting our core argument.
48 France’s high casualty rates in World War I, an example of a democratic country being willing to accept high
casualties from a conscription army, helped drive French military doctrine of the 1930s. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for pointing this out.
49 For more on this point, please see Appendix S2.
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character of the army at hand, in part determined by recruitment policies, volun-
teer armies are less likely to ﬁnd themselves engaged in particularly risky and
costly wars.
Both democracies and autocracies seem more cautious with expensive, well-
trained volunteer troops than they are with conscript armies. This ﬁnding applies
to both initiators and targets. The former is not particularly surprising: one would
expect governments to be choosy about which wars into which they send their vol-
unteers. But even volunteer targets (who have not selected themselves into a war)
suffer proportionally fewer casualties than their conscripting counterparts. We
present strong correlations as evidence that the non-market mechanism by which
conscripts enter into service tends to result in their relatively wasteful use by
national governments.
However, there remains something a bit different about liberal democracies.
These states do not use their conscripts as cannon fodder, throwing men
against ﬁre in desperate efforts to win, but when targeted by authoritarian
states, contra the hopes of autocratic aggressors, democratic societies are willing
to bear the costs of large-scale commitments to maintaining states’ sovereignty
and autonomy, sometimes even in the face of certain defeat. We see here, then,
a revealing intersection between the property takings and the democratic peace
literatures.
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